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II  
Autonomy And ProtectIon of Persons wItH 
mentAl dIsorders… A conflIct of VAlues?
claire RommelaeRe
Assistant at University of Namur
A. – research context
This contribution is the draft (1) of the sub-thesis of a Ph.D 
project entitled “Persons with mental disorders and interventions 
of health professionals: reconciling autonomy and protection”. (2)
The question of the meaning and relations of such concepts as 
autonomy and protection were inspired by the ambitious reform 
of Belgian law regarding legal incapacity of adults. (3) Parliamen-
tary works reflect, indeed, the obsessional intention to strike a 
fair balance between autonomy and protection. (4) This constant 
search of a compromise could mean that autonomy and protection 
are antagonistic principles: basically, either we respect autonomy 
of people by not interfering with their choices, or we protect people 
and, for their own sake or the one of others, we interfere; as it is 
impossible to promote both autonomy and protection, the best we 
can do is to work towards a compromise. 
 (1)   Dated October 15, 2015.
 (2)   Original title: “La personne atteinte d’un trouble mental et les interventions de 
professionnels de la santé : (ré)concilier autonomie et protection”. 
 (3)   Act reforming incapacity regimes and introducing a new protection status in accor-
dance with human dignity (Loi du 17 mars 2013 réformant les régimes d’incapacité et ins-
taurant un nouveau statut de protection conforme à la dignité humaine, M.B., 14 June 2013, 
p. 38132).
 (4)   Among others: Proposition de loi instaurant un statut global des personnes majeures 
incapables, Doc. parl., Ch., 2010-2011, No. 1009/001, p. 6 ; Proposition de loi instaurant un 
statut global des personnes majeures incapables et proposition de loi instaurant un régime 
global d’administration provisoire des biens et des personnes, Rapport fait au nom de la 
Commission de la Justice, Doc. parl., Ch., 2011-2012, No. 1009/010, pp. 237 and 258.
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However, one may wonder whether this opposition is as unques-
tionable as it seems to be. Firstly, a real exploration of the concepts 
is needed: the notions of autonomy and protection, especially their 
meaning in law, are not immediately clear. Besides, they raise the 
issue of human dignity. 
The opposition between autonomy and protection should more-
over be challenged, for this systematic opposition could prevent 
the development of more creative or effective legal tools. Such hy-
pothesis does not only concern rules governing legal incapacity, 
but also all rules that are likely to impact the situation of persons 
with mental disorders, in the healthcare field. For example, the 
patient’s rights or the rules about involuntary placement in psy-
chiatric facilities also raise the issues of autonomy and protection.
The hypothesis which is the starting point of my research could 
therefore be formulated as follows: to develop new or better legal 
tools regarding mental health, the conflict between autonomy and 
protection should be transcended.
In this context, the first question I address is the legal meaning 
of the concepts of autonomy and protection but also of human dig-
nity, which is often called upon in legal texts about incapacity or 
(mental) health. As law does not necessarily reflect the usual mean-
ing of words, a research of their precise legal meaning is useful: on 
the one hand, the legal meaning of the word says something about 
its social – maybe intuitive – acceptation; (5) to be more practical, 
on the other hand, let’s say that if the law promotes for example 
the autonomy of persons with mental disorders, the full meaning 
of this objective must be understood in its right sense if we want to 
be able to check whether the objective has been achieved, or could 
be achieved, or could be achieved in a better way.
B. – Reflexions Over the Legal Construction 
of three key-concepts
The obviously easiest way to grasp the legal meanings of the 
concepts of autonomy, protection and human dignity was to start 
with a textual analysis. The hypothesis I wish to present here is 
 (5)   o. leclerc, “Quelle analyse juridique pour les objets non juridiques ?”, Course ad-
dressed to doctoral students belonging to the late “Académie Louvain”, as part of doctoral 
training, 24 January 2014.
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thus the result of a search for my key-concepts in Belgian and 
international texts about legal capacity, the patient’s rights, invol-
untary placement or treatment in psychiatric hospitals, the rights 
of persons with disabilities, bioethics and human rights… All pre-
selected texts (6) were thoroughly analysed, but only those that 
expressly mention the key-concepts will be mentioned as examples 
below.
1. Autonomy, a capacity Between Independence 
and Interaction
When searching for the legal meaning of autonomy, one can-
not miss the link that is frequently made between autonomy and 
legal capacity: “capacité : la compétence d’exercer ses droits et de-
voirs soi-même et de façon autonome”; (7) “Si, pour des motifs fon-
dés, le médecin estime que ce refus émane d’un patient qui n’est 
plus en mesure d’exercer ses droits de manière autonome, il devra 
s’adresser au mandataire du patient”; (8) “For persons who are not 
 (6)   For Belgian law, the analysis focuses on legal texts that are likely to impact the 
situation of persons with mental disorders, in the healthcare field: dispositions of the Code of 
Civil Law about incapacity (Art. 488-502, as modified by the Loi du 17 mars 2013 réformant 
les régimes d’incapacité et instaurant un nouveau statut de protection conforme à la dignité 
humaine, M.B., 14 June 2013, p. 38132) and Patient’s Rights Act (Loi du 22 août 2002 relative 
aux droits du patient, M.B., 26 septembre 2002, p. 43719) for the impact on healthcare deci-
sions, and on acts about involuntary placement in psychiatric facilities (Loi du 26 juin 1990 
relative à la protection de la personne des malades mentaux, M.B., 27 July 1990, p. 14806 ; 
Loi du 5 mai 2014 relative à l’internement de personnes, M.B., 9 July 2014, p. 52159 – which 
should come into force in July 2016), for the impact on healthcare location. The parliamen-
tary documents leading to these acts were equally searched. At an international level, raw 
material consists of instruments of the Council of Europe (Convention on Human Rights and 
Biomedicine, Oviedo, 4 April 1997 – it has not been signed by Belgium but remains never-
theless an inspiring text; Recomm. No. R (83) 2 concerning the legal protection of persons 
suffering from mental disorder placed as involuntary patients; Recomm. R(99)4 on principles 
concerning the legal protection of incapable adults; Recomm. Rec(2004)10 concerning the 
protection of the human rights and dignity of persons with mental disorder; Recomm. CM/
Rec(2009)3 on monitoring the protection of human rights and dignity of persons with mental 
disorder ; Recomm. CM/Rec(2009)11on principles concerning continuing powers of attorney 
and advance directives for incapacity) and of United Nations (Declaration on the Rights of 
Mentally Retarded Persons, Resol. No. 2856, 20 December 1971; Declaration on the Rights 
of Disabled Persons, Resol. No. 3447, 9 December 1975; Principles for the Protection of Per-
sons with Mental Illness and for the Improvement of Mental Health Care, Resol. No. 46/119, 
17 December 1991; Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, signed in New 
York, 13 December 2006, approved in Belgium by an Act of 13 May 2009), including UNESCO 
(Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights, 19 October 2005), these organisa-
tions being the most directive through recommendations or in conventions they enjoined their 
members to adhere to.
 (7)   Civ. C., art. 491, e). I underline.
 (8)   Projet de loi relatif aux droits du patient, Proposition de loi complétant la loi sur 
les hôpitaux, coordonnée le 7 août 1987, en ce qui concerne le droit de plainte du patient, 
F.U.N.D.P. (138.48.8.120)
II - Autonomy and Protection of Persons with Mental Disorders… A Conflict of Values?
Éditions Larcier - © Groupe Larcier
304 claire rommelaere
bruylant
capable of exercising autonomy, special measures are to be taken 
to protect their rights and interests”; (9) “The following principles 
apply to the protection of adults who, by reason of an impairment 
or insufficiency of their personal faculties, are incapable of mak-
ing, in an autonomous way, decisions concerning any or all of their 
personal or economic affairs, or understanding, expressing or act-
ing upon such decisions and who consequently cannot protect their 
interests”. (10)
Particularly in the last examples, we can see that autonomy is 
often mentioned as a mere synonym of decision-making capacity: 
to be autonomous is to be able to make decisions and act accord-
ing to them without any interference of others. In that sense, au-
tonomy involves reasoning abilities as well as protection against 
interferences. 
Reasoning abilities, that a judge or a caregiver could have to 
assess, in order to know whether a person can make her own deci-
sions or whether a substitute decision-maker must be appointed, 
are generally summarised as follows:
 – understanding the relevant information;
 – assessing one’s own situation and the reasonably fore-
seeable consequences, for oneself, of the decision;
 – reasoning about (treatment) options, weighing up different 
options; 
 – making one’s choice known. (11)
Any person meeting these conditions must be protected from the 
interference of others in the course of the decisional process: in 
the name of autonomy, the Belgian Code of Civil Law, inspired by 
Proposition de loi relative au contrat de soins médicaux et aux droits du patient, Proposition 
de loi relative aux droits du patient, Rapport fait au nom de la Commission affaires sociales, 
Doc. parl., Sén., 2001-2002, No. 2-1250/3, p. 55. I underline.
 (9)   Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights, 19 October 2005, Art. 5. I 
underline.
 (10)   Council of Europe, Recommendations R(99)4 on principles concerning the legal 
protection of incapable adults, principle 1. I underline.
 (11)   K. rottHier, Gedwongen opname van de geesteszieke, Bruges, Die Keure, 2012, 
p. 272; L.L. sessums et al., “Does This Patient Have Medical Decision-Making Capacity?”, 
JAMA, 2011, p. 421; P.S. appelBaum, “Assessment of Patients’ Competence to Consent to 
Treatment”, N. Engl. J. Med., 2007, p. 1836. For an example in statutory law, see English 
law: England and Wales Mental Capacity Act 2005 (c.1, s.3: general definition of inability to 
make decisions), The National Archives, www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2005/9/part/1.
F.U.N.D.P. (138.48.8.120)
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the Council of Europe, (12) tends consequently to postpone and to 
reduce as much as possible any measure of incapacity, which de-
prives a person from exercising her rights all by herself. 
Autonomy could then simply appear as the independent exercise 
of legal capacity, which requires rational abilities on the one hand, 
protection against interferences on the other hand.
However, our Code of Civil Law also claims that a measure of 
legal incapacity should increase the autonomy of the incapable 
person as much as possible. (13) This is enough to question the 
autonomy-capacity tandem. Besides, the Convention of the Coun-
cil of Europe on Human Rights and Biomedicine insists, in its Ex-
planatory Report, on the respect “for the autonomy and dignity of 
the person in all circumstances, even if the person is considered 
legally incapable of giving consent”. (14) It is also noticeable that 
the guide to the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Dis-
abilities includes in the notion of autonomy the help one can need 
to make one’s own decisions: “Respect for the individual autonomy 
of persons with disabilities means that persons with disabilities 
have, on an equal basis with others, reasonable life choices, are 
subject to minimum interference in their private life and can make 
their own decisions, with adequate support where required”. (15)
Far from a heresy, these provisions express another conception 
of autonomy, which is more subtle and intuitive than the mere 
ability to exercise one’s rights without any assistance. 
To qualify this refined conception of autonomy, I sought and 
found support in the works of two North American authors, Ag-
nieszka Jaworska in the context of the Alzheimer disease and Jen-
nifer Nedelsky in a more politico-social approach. 
A. Jaworska separates autonomy from legal capacity, under-
stood as a full decision-making capacity. Capacity for autonomy, in 
her approach, is a ‘capacity to value’, regardless of the help eventu-
ally needed to make decisions in accordance with one’s values or 
 (12)   Council of Europe, Recommendations R(99)4 on principles concerning the legal 
protection of incapable adults.
 (13)   Art. 497: “L’administration accroît, dans la mesure du possible, l’autonomie de la 
personne protégée”.
 (14)   Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine, Explanatory Report, 17 December 
1996, conventions.coe.int, § 106.
 (15)   UN, Monitoring the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, Guidance 
for human rights monitors professional training series No. 17, New-York and Geneva, 2010, 
p. 19. I underline.
F.U.N.D.P. (138.48.8.120)
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to translate one’s decisions into appropriate actions: “the capacity 
for autonomy ought not to be thought of as the capacity to carry 
out one’s convictions into action without external help, a capacity 
that requires reasoning through complex sets of circumstances to 
reach the most appropriate autonomous decisions; rather, that the 
capacity for autonomy is first and foremost the capacity to espouse 
values and convictions, whose translation into action may not al-
ways be fully within the agent’s mastery”. (16)
Due to the important part she attributes to the support of oth-
ers in exercising one’s autonomy, A. Jaworska’s work can be situ-
ated in the line of relational autonomy, (17) developed inter alia by 
Jennifer Nedelsky in an article dedicated to the idea of reconceiv-
ing autonomy. (18) In this enlightening contribution, J. Nedelsky 
seeks to reconcile the autonomy, as a “human capacity for making 
one’s own life and self”, (19) and the inevitable social influence of 
the choices we make in exercising that capacity: from the protec-
tion against social interferences, the issue switches to promotion 
of autonomy within the social sphere. Relatedness becomes a main 
component of autonomy, as we are collective beings: “[…] people do 
not exist in isolation, but in social and political relations. People 
develop their predispositions, their interests, their autonomy – in 
short, their identity – in large part out of these relations. The 
very way one experiences and perceives the world, for example, is 
shaped by the social construction of language. The task, then, is 
to think of autonomy in terms of the forms of human interactions 
in which it will develop and flourish”. (20)
As above-mentioned, the legal meaning of autonomy must be 
larger than a mere synonym of legal capacity. Otherwise, some 
legal instruments would be irrational: if autonomy is capacity, how 
could an incapacity measure promote autonomy, as enjoined by our 
Code of Civil Law? Moreover, I cannot admit that such an impor-
tant concept, given the countless times it is used in the analysed 
 (16)   A. jaWorska, “Respecting the Margins of Agency: Alzheimer’s Patients and the 
Capacity to Value”, Philosophy and Public Affairs, 1999, 28, p. 126. For a helpful comment, 
see f. gzil, “La question éthique du respect de l’autonomie”, Annales médico-psychologiques, 
2009, 167, pp. 230-233. 
 (17)   See also n. rigaux, “Autonomie et démence I : Pour une conception de l’autonomie 
‘dementia-friendly’”, Ger. Psychol. Neuropsychiatr. Vieil., 2011, p. 112.
 (18)   j. nedelsky, “Reconceiving Autonomy: Sources, Thoughts and Possibilities”, Yale 
J. of law and Feminism, 1989, pp. 7-36.
 (19)   Ibid., p. 8.
 (20)   Ibid., p. 21.
F.U.N.D.P. (138.48.8.120)
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texts, adds no value at all to the legal discourse: where is the added 
value of the recourse to the concept of autonomy if it is a synonym 
of a well-known legal notion? In other words, autonomy should be 
defined in such a way it makes sense in our legal discourse.
The works of A. Jaworska and J. Nedelsky give clues to complete 
the textual analyse and qualify, in a legal context, autonomy as a 
concept which is independent from legal capacity. So far, it seems 
consistent with the above-analysed texts to describe autonomy as 
a capacity to value, which is indeed specific to the individual, but 
which is built, developed and translated into decisions and actions 
through relationships with others.
This understanding of autonomy does not exclude (decision-
making) capacity but is not limited to this acceptation. Autonomy 
includes capable and incapable people, as long as they express 
attachment to values, but regardless of whether they need help in 
order to act according to these values.
Let’s now examine the notion of protection and see how it could 
be matched with a reconceived autonomy.
2. Protection Versus Autonomy: Antagonism?
In Belgian law, the legal texts that are likely to impact the situa-
tion of persons with mental disorders attribute to the word ‘protec-
tion’ a very specific meaning: incapacity decisions are called ‘mea-
sures of protection’ (21) and so are involuntary hospitalisations of 
persons suffering from a mental illness. (22) Moreover, recent acts 
about internment of persons with mental disorders who committed 
an offense define internment as a safety measure seeking both to 
protect society and to care for the internee. (23) In international 
 (21)   Civ. C., Art. 491, a): “personne protégée : une personne majeure qui, par une déci-
sion de justice prise conformément à l’article 492/1, a été déclarée incapable d’accomplir un 
ou plusieurs actes”.
 (22)   Loi du 26 juin 1990 relative à la protection de la personne des malades mentaux, 
Art. 1: “Sauf les mesures de protection prévues par la présente loi, le diagnostic et le trai-
tement des troubles psychiques ne peuvent donner lieu à aucune restriction de la liberté 
individuelle […]” ; the so-called protection measures actually refer to hospitalisation as well 
as to treatment in ‘family settings’ but, for simplicity’s sake, only the term of hospitalisation 
will be used here.
 (23)   Loi du 21 avril 2007 relative à l’internement des personnes atteintes d’un trouble 
mental, M.B., 13 July 2007, p. 38271, Art. 2 (will be repealed before coming into force by the 
Act of 5 May 2014); loi du 5 mai 2014 relative à l’internement de personnes, M.B., 9 July 
2014, p. 52159, Art. 2 (should come into force in July 2016).
F.U.N.D.P. (138.48.8.120)
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texts, the word ‘protection’ is used in its usual meaning (24) and 
no trace could be found in these texts of the tendency to categorise 
involuntary hospitalisation as a ‘measure of protection’. 
However, Belgian law does not seem inconsistent when bringing 
closer to each other measures such as decision of legal incapacity, 
involuntary hospitalisation and internment. Even though they dif-
fer significantly in their procedures, objectives or actual develop-
ment, they still have a point in common, at a more abstract level, 
for they all seek to protect both the individual concerned by the 
measure and the society in general: decisions of incapacity allow 
persons with insufficient reasoning abilities to receive support in 
exercising their rights, while limiting risks, for capable others, to 
conclude legal acts that would then be declared invalid for lack 
of consent of the other party; involuntary hospitalisation can be 
applied in the case of a risk for the mentally ill person to harm 
herself or others; as to internment, its purpose is to protect society 
and to offer care to the internee, in order to ensure his or her social 
reintegration.
Thus, theoretically, these measures share an ultimate objective, 
which consists in allowing a person with a disorder to live in soci-
ety, with the support she needs to achieve that purpose: persons 
considered incapable by a judge will be assisted by an administra-
tor and persons hospitalised in psychiatric facilities or interned 
should receive all appropriate healthcare to be able to live in soci-
ety without being a risk for themselves or others.
A legal construction of the notion of protection, in its specific 
meaning, could therefore be analysed as a set of judiciary mea-
sures – decisions of incapacity, involuntary hospitalisation, intern-
ment – taken in order to compensate for the lack of decision-making 
abilities of a person or to prevent a person suffering from a mental 
disorder to harm herself or others, with as ultimate objective to 
(try to) foster this person’s management of her life in our society.
Is this antagonistic with the legal construction of autonomy, as 
described in the previous section?
It does not seem so: autonomy, as a capacity to express values 
guiding our choices, cannot flourish and be translated in our lives 
 (24)   Except for Recommendation No. R (99) 4 of the Council of Europe (on principles 
concerning the legal protection of incapable adults), which directly inspired the Belgian Code 
of Civil Law.
F.U.N.D.P. (138.48.8.120)
II - Autonomy and Protection of Persons with Mental Disorders… A Conflict of Values?
Éditions Larcier - © Groupe Larcier
 autonomy and protection of persons WitH mental disorders 309
bruylant
without interactions, relationships to others appearing as an es-
sential component of autonomy. Therefore, the concern for auton-
omy first implies to seek to restore relationships that have been 
threatened by a mental disorder, which is the purpose of legal 
measures of protection. Consequently, these measures are not op-
posed to autonomy, which they try, conversely, to preserve or re-
store. As J. Nedelsky advised it, our legislator tries “to think of 
autonomy in terms of the forms of human interactions in which it 
will develop and flourish”. (25)
However, this should be nuanced here, for there is an undeni-
able difference between the immediate and the ultimate objectives 
of a measure of protection: in a first stage, such a measure seeks 
to prevent a person from harming herself or others and, to this 
purpose, it takes the form of an exclusion, either legal – incapacity 
– or physical – hospitalisation or internment. Such means present 
a high risk of annihilation of a person’s autonomy, which is toler-
able only because the ultimate objective consists of a restoration of 
relationships with others and of social life. In other words, only the 
ultimate objective of these measures legitimates the risky means 
used to reach their immediate objective. Therefore, the ultimate 
objective of a measure of protection must colour all aspects of this 
measure.
The tendency to oppose autonomy and protection should be re-
phrased as a tension between immediate and ultimate objectives 
of a measure of protection: applying the means of the immediate 
objective one should never forget the ultimate objective, otherwise 
one would jeopardize the legitimacy of the measure… or, maybe, 
human dignity? 
3. Human dignity
A remarkable point about human dignity is that it is most of 
the time mentioned in the title, in the preamble or in the very 
first provisions of the textual sources, whether at a national (26) 
 (25)   j. nedelsky, “Reconceiving Autonomy: Sources, Thoughts and Possibilities”, 
op. cit., p. 21.
 (26)   The Act reforming incapacity regimes in the Code of Civil Law is entitled the Loi 
du 17 mars 2013 réformant les régimes d’incapacité et instaurant un nouveau statut de pro-
tection conforme à la dignité humaine (M.B., 14 June 2013, p. 38132); in the Patient’s Rights 
Act, the first article about patients’rights mentions the right to respect of one’s human dignity 
(Loi du 22 août 2002 relative aux droits du patient, M.B., 26 September 2002, p. 43719, 
F.U.N.D.P. (138.48.8.120)
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or international (27) level. Formally, this observation underlines 
the importance of the notion but does not give any clue about its 
essence.
As to a substantial content of human dignity, Belgian sources 
only offer application examples. Indeed, in parliamentary docu-
ments, human dignity is invoked to insist on the importance of 
considering abilities of others rather than their inabilities (28), 
preserving private life and intimacy of patients, (29) relieving 
their pain, (30) providing for appropriate mental healthcare when 
needed (31) or avoiding to refer to a person using one problematic 
feature so, for example, saying the ‘interned person’ rather than 
‘the internee’. (32)
Such intuitive applications seem all to refer to human beings’ 
intrinsic worth. This interpretation is more clearly expressed by 
international sources, whose level of abstraction is higher: “Recall-
Art. 5) ; in the internment act, the second provision refers to the notion: “Compte tenu du 
risque pour la sécurité et de l’état de santé de la personne internée, [la personne internée] se 
verra proposer les soins dont elle a besoin pour mener une vie conforme à la dignité humaine” 
(Loi du 5 mai 2014 relative à l’internement de personnes, M.B., 9 July 2014, p. 52159 (should 
come into force in July 2016), Art. 2, al. 2).
 (27)   Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Dignity of the Human Being 
with regard to the Application of Biology and Medicine: Convention on Human Rights and 
Biomedicine, Oviedo, 4 April 1997; Recommendation Rec(2004)10 concerning the protec-
tion of the human rights and dignity of persons with mental disorder; preambles of the UN 
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, signed in New York, 13 December 
2006, approved in Belgium by an Act of 13 May 2009 and of the UNESCO Universal Decla-
ration on Bioethics and Human Rights, 19 October 2005.
 (28)   Proposition de loi instaurant un statut global des personnes majeures incapables 
et proposition de loi instaurant un régime global d’administration provisoire des biens et des 
personnes, Rapport fait au nom de la Commission de la Justice, Doc. parl., Ch., 2011-2012, 
No. 1009/010, p. 100.
 (29)   Projet de loi relatif aux droits du patient […], Rapport fait au nom de la Commission 
de la santé publique, de l’environnement et du renouveau de la société, Doc. parl., Ch., 2001-
2002, No. 50-1642/12, pp. 26, 30 et 63. 
 (30)   Proposition de loi modifiant la loi du 22 août 2002 relative aux droits du patient 
en y insérant le droit pour toute personne de recevoir des soins visant à soulager sa douleur, 
ainsi que l’arrêté royal n° 78 du 10 novembre 1967 relatif à l’exercice des professions des soins 
de santé, Doc. parl., Ch., 2003-2004, No. 0551/001, p. 4 ; Projet de loi relatif aux droits du 
patient, Amendements, Doc. parl., Ch., 2001-2002, No. 50-1642/8, p. 2 ; Projet de loi relatif 
aux droits du patient […], Rapport fait au nom de la Commission de la santé publique, de l’en-
vironnement et du renouveau de la société, Doc. parl., Ch., 2001-2002, No. 50-1642/12, p. 12.
 (31)   Art 2 de la loi du 5 mai 2014 relative à l’internement des personnes (non en vigueur) 
et travaux préparatoires : Proposition de loi relative à l’internement de personnes, Dévelop-
pements, Doc. parl., Sén., 2012-2013, No. 5-2001/1, pp. 15 et 65 ; Proposition de loi relative à 
l’internement de personnes, Rapport fait au nom de la Commission de la Justice, Doc. parl., 
Sén., 2013-2014, No. 5-2001/6, p. 19.
 (32)   Proposition de loi relative à l’internement de personnes, Rapport fait au nom de la 
Commission de la Justice, Doc. parl., Sén., 2013-2014, No. 5-2001/6, pp. 50-51.
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ing the principles proclaimed in the Charter of the United Nations 
which recognize the inherent dignity and worth and the equal and 
inalienable rights of all members of the human family as the foun-
dation of freedom, justice and peace in the world (…)”; (33) “Inher-
ent dignity refers to the worth of every person”; (34) “The funda-
mental equality of all human beings in dignity and rights is to be 
respected so that they are treated justly and equitably”… (35)
Generally, human dignity refers to the worth of human beings, 
regardless of their specific situation.
This description does certainly not do justice to the endless con-
troversies about the essence and the scope of human dignity but 
perhaps it could be an interesting addition to the conceptual frame 
of the research. The reference to human dignity could indeed be 
invoked in the assessment of measures of protection: where a mea-
sure of protection fails to fulfil its role and proves to be ineffective 
in restoring what could be restored of relationships with others, 
it becomes a mere exclusion measure incompatible with the worth 
that one should grant each fellow human being. A break in the 
balance between immediate – prevention of harm – and ultimate 
– restoration of social relationships – objectives of a measure of 
protection could then be described as a violation of human dignity.
c. – Provisional synthesis 
The first part of my doctoral research is aiming at building a 
conceptual frame from the analysis of three key-concepts, in the 
legal instruments that are likely to influence the situation, in the 
healthcare field, of a person suffering from a mental disorder: au-
tonomy, protection and human dignity.
The construction of autonomy in legal texts was described as a 
capacity to value, which is specific to the individual, but which is 
built, developed and translated into decisions and actions through 
relationships with others. As to the concept of protection, it is ana-
 (33)   Preamble, a), of the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, 
signed in New York, 13 December 2006, approved in Belgium by an Act of 13 May 2009.
 (34)   UN, Monitoring the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. Guidance 
for human rights monitors Professional training series No. 17, New-York and Geneva, 2010, 
p. 18.
 (35)   UNESCO, Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights, 19 October 2005, 
Art. 10.
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lysed as a set of judiciary measures – decisions of incapacity, invol-
untary hospitalisation, internment – taken in order to compensate 
for the lack of decision-making abilities of a person or to prevent a 
person suffering from a mental disorder to harm herself or others, 
with as ultimate objective to (try to) foster this person’s manage-
ment of her life in our society.
Therefore, it does not seem relevant to consider both autonomy 
and protection as values, nor to see an antagonism between these 
concepts. Given the earlier developments, I would tend to refer 
to autonomy only as a value, while measures of protection are at 
the service of this value: indeed, measures of protection seek to 
preserve autonomy by maintaining or restoring one of its essential 
components, i.e. social relationships.
Unsurprisingly, human dignity appears as a fundamental value, 
the essence and status of which remain nevertheless unclear. Fur-
ther work is needed, especially to explore more deeply the links be-
tween autonomy and human dignity in law and moral philosophy. 
So far, let’s say that defining human dignity as the intrinsic worth 
of human beings could complete the conceptual frame by qualify-
ing a failing protection measure as a violation of human dignity.
A well-thought conceptual frame should subsequently foster a 
finer legal analysis of the challenges the question of the autonomy 
of patients in the mental health field is raising.
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